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CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY IN
NAPSTER VERSUS GROKSTER: A DISTINCTION
WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE*
David Corwin**
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 2003, in MGM v. Grokster,' U.S. District Judge Stephen
Wilson granted summary judgment in defendants' favor on a copyright
infringement lawsuit brought by a group of movie studios, record
companies, and music publishers against Grokster and StreamCast
(formerly known as MusicCity Networks), two "peer-to-peer" services that
enable their users to illegally copy and distribute copyrighted music and
movies over the Internet.2 The decision engendered particular interest as
one of the first decisions to examine the liability of a peer-to-peer service in
the wake of the Ninth Circuit's much-publicized decision in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster.3
As in the Napster decision, the Grokster court easily concluded that
the users of defendants' services were directly infringing upon plaintiffs'
copyrighted works.4 The crux of the Grokster decision, however, was
whether the Grokster defendants were secondarily liable for their users'
infringement.5 Specifically, the court examined whether defendants were
* On August 19, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its decision
in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir., 2004), affirming the
district court's ruling that distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing software such as Morpheus and
Grokster do not infringe copyright. This article was written prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision.
** At the time this article was written, David Corwin was Senior Counsel with the Motion
Picture Association of America, Worldwide Anti-Piracy.
1. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
2. Id. at 1031; see also Metro-Goldwin-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6994 (listing U.S. District Judge Stephen Wilson as granting defendant Grokster's motion for
summary judgment and denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment against defendants
Grokster and StreamCast Networks).
3. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. Grokster at 1034-35.
5. Id. at 1031.
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liable on either a contributory liability theory or a vicarious liability
theory.6 This article focuses on the contributory liability analysis.
The Napster court held that Napster likely was liable for contributory
copyright infringement because it knew or had reason to know of its users'
infringing activities, and materially contributed to these infringements.'
The Grokster court, however, concluded that the Grokster defendants were
not liable for contributory infringement as a matter of law.8 The primary
factual distinction between the two systems, and the apparent basis for the
court's decision was that, whereas critical communications relating to the
unlawful distribution of copyrighted files on Napster were routed through
Napster's centralized computers, defendants' systems were engineered so
that all such transactions bypassed their computers. 9 This article examines
whether the distinction relied upon by the Grokster decision warrants a
different conclusion on this issue than the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Napster. It concludes that the distinction relied on by the Grokster court is
a distinction without a legal difference and that the Grokster ruling on this
issue was erroneous.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Napster
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction in favor
of record company plaintiffs enjoining Napster from "engaging in, or
facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or
distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and sound
recordings."' 10 The Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs established a
likelihood of success that Napster had both contributorily and vicariously
infringed upon plaintiffs' copyrights in their music.1
Napster was an Internet service that facilitated the transmission of
MP3 music files between and among its users. 12 Napster, through software
which it provided for free on its Internet website, enabled its users to make
music files on the hard drives of their computers available to other Napster
users, search for music files on other users' hard drives, and transfer the
6. See id. at 1035-36.
7. Napster at 1021-22.
8. Grokster at 1043.
9. Id. at 1040.
10. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
11. Id. at 1024.
12. Id. at 1011.
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music files from one user to another.1 3 Among its other services, Napster
provided technical support, maintained a chat room where its users could
interact, and provided a directory where artists could provide information
about their music.
14
After downloading the software, first-time users were required to
register with the Napster system by creating a "user name" and password
for future entrance to the site.' 5 Once a user entered a "user name" and
password, he could proceed to use the service.1 6 To make music files
available to other Napster users, the user would first create a "user library"
directory on his hard drive, designating each file he wished to share with an
identifying file name. 7 The Napster software would then search the user's
hard drive for available files in the proper MP3 format.1 8 The software
would then upload the file names of all properly formatted files from the
user's hard drive to the Napster computers (also known as "servers").
1 9
These file names would then be added to Napster's "collective directory,"2 °
and would be accessible by other Napster users as long as the offering user
remained online.2 ' Once the offering user logged off the Napster service,
the music files obtained from his hard drive would no longer appear on the
22site, and would no longer remain available to other Napster users.
The primary means to navigate the Napster system for music files was
through Napster's search function.23 The user, once logged into the
Napster system, would access a form made by the software.24 The user
would complete the form by entering either the name of the song or a
particular artist.25 The request would be transmitted to a Napster server and
compared to the identifying file names made available by other Napster
26users on-line at the time. Napster's server would then compile a list of all
instances where the search terms matched the identifying file names
provided by other users, and send the resulting file names to the searching
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Napster at 1011.
17. Id. at 1011-12.
18. Id. at 1012.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Napster at 1011-12.
23. Id. at 1012
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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user.27 To download a music file from another user, a user simply would
click on the appropriately marked "link" on the computer screen.28  The
Napster servers would then obtain and provide the Internet address of the
offering user to the requesting user.29 The requesting user's computer used
the offering user's Internet address to establish a connection with the
offering user's computer. 30  Once this connection was established, the
music file would be downloaded from the hard drive of the offering user's
computer to the hard drive of the requesting user's computer.31
B. Grokster
Grokster is a peer-to-peer service that capitalized on- Napster's
downfall.32  Ultimately, millions of Napster's users migrated to this
service.33 Unlike Napster, however, Grokster's service allows users to
search for and transfer not only music files but media files of all types,
including motion pictures.34
From a user's perspective, the experience of using these services is
virtually no different from the Napster experience.35 As with Napster, a
user begins by downloading the software offered by Grokster.36 New users
obtain access to the user network, which, in turn, allows users to make
available, search for, and transfer files with other users. 37 As with Napster,
27. Id.
28. See Napster at 1012.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Until March 2002, Grokster and StreamCast (along with a third service, Kazaa) shared a
common user network, dubbed the FastTrack network. John Borland, Morpheus looks to Gnutella
for help, NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-846944.html (last visited March 8,
2004). Around February and March 2002, Streamcast users were excluded from the FastTrack
network. Id. StreamCast thereafter made available to its users new software which provided users
access to the "Gnutella" network. Id. In most respects, StreamCast's new software-and the
"Gnutella" network-enable its users to engage in the same activities as with the FastTrack
network: indexing, search capabilities, and the ability to both obtain copyrighted works and to
copy and distribute copyrighted works to others. Id. Rather than using supernodes like its
FastTrack counterpart, however, search requests on "Gnutella" are passed from user to user until
a match is found or until the search request expires. Grokster at 1041. Due to space constraints,
this paper does not analyze StreamCast's peer-to-peer network considered by the court in the
Grokster opinion.
33. Borland, supra note 32.
34. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
35. Id. at 1032.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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all file transfers take place directly between users' computers; the files do
not pass through Grokster's computers.38
Also like Napster, Grokster's Terms of Service, to which every user is
required to agree, explicitly states that Grokster reserves the right to block
unlawful content and terminate users who violate Grokster's copyright
infringement policy. 39 Plaintiffs also submitted evidence that Grokster is
able to filter out or block infringing files from the networks and could filter
or block infringing material from being distributed.40 A primary distinction
between Grokster's service and Napster's service is that in Napster, the
search function and the index of available files existed on and through
Napster's central servers.4 In Grokster, these functions are performed by
users' computers that the network software automatically identified as
being sufficiently powerful to carry out these tasks.42 These users, dubbed
"supernodes," become supernodes without any decision or action by the
user.43 Each supernode is typically connected to hundreds of users, as well
as other supernodes. 4 Thus, in contrast to Napster, search requests and file
transfers run through user computers-the supernodes-rather than through
central servers operated by Grokster.45
III. THE DECISIONS
A. The Ninth Circuit Decision in Napster
The Napster case came before the Ninth Circuit on appeal from Judge
Patel's ruling in the District Court granting the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction.46
The Ninth Circuit's decision focused on the question of whether
Napster was liable to the plaintiffs on a secondary copyright infringement
theory, specifically on the theories of contributory and vicarious
infringement.47 The Ninth Circuit, noting that "[s]econdary liability for
38. See id. at 1040.
39. End User License Agreement, Grokster.com, available at
http://www.grokster.com/us/terms (last visited March 30, 2004).
40. Grokster at 1045.
41. Id. at 1039.
42. See id. at 1040.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
47. Id. at 1019.
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copyright infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement
by a third party, 48 first focused on the direct liability of Napster's users.49
The court quickly and easily affirmed that Napster's users had infringed
upon plaintiffs' copyrights, concluding that the users had infringed upon
"at least two of the copyright holders' exclusive rights: the rights of
reproduction, [section] 106(1); and distribution, [section] 106(3).,,5o
Once the Ninth Circuit concluded that Napster's users were
committing infringement, it then turned to the issue of Napster's secondary
liability .5  The court set forth the liability standard for contributory
copyright infringement: "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer., 52 The court
noted that "[c]ontributory liability requires that the secondary infringer
'know or have reason to know' of direct infringement." 53 It approved of
the lower court's finding that Napster had "both actual and constructive
knowledge that its users exchanged copyrighted music"54 and, while it
concluded that Napster had knowledge of specific infringing material,
appeared to agree with Judge Patel's conclusion that "the law does not
require knowledge of 'specific acts of infringement."'
55
The Ninth Circuit also viewed the U.S. Supreme Court case of Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.56 as supporting its conclusion.57 The
Supreme Court in Sony declined to hold the manufacturer of VCRs liable
for contributory infringement. 58 It stated that if liability "is to be imposed
on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that
equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material."59
Liability may not be imposed, the Court stated, simply because the
48. Id. at 1013 n.2.
49. Id. at 1014.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1019.
52. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
53. Napster at 1020 (quoting Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc.,
902 F.2d 829, 845-846 (1 1th Cir. 1990)) (superseded by statute on other grounds in Chew v.
Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998)).
54. Id. at 1020.
55. Napster at 1021-22.
56. Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
57. See Napster at 1020-21.
58. Sony at 456.
59. Id. at 439.
NAPSTER VERSUS GROKSTER
manufactured product may be used to assist infringing activity. 60 The
Court added that it was inappropriate to impose liability where the
defendant sold equipment capable of both infringing and "substantial
noninfringing uses. 61  Following the standard established in the Sony
decision, however, the Napster court concluded that this defense did not
apply-regardless of the relative magnitude of infringing versus
noninfringing uses-where, as was the case with Napster, the system at
issue "knew or had reason to know of its users' infringement of plaintiffs'
copyrights. 62
The Ninth Circuit had no trouble concluding that Napster materially
contributed to its users' infringements.63 It agreed with the lower court that
"'[w]ithout the support services defendant provides, Napster users could
not find and download the music they want with the ease of which
defendant boasts.' 64  Stating that Napster provided "'the site and
facilities"' for the infringement,65 it held that Napster materially
contributed to the direct infringement of its users, and, therefore, that
plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits on the
contributory infringement claim.66
B. The District Court's Decision in Grokster
The Grokster case was litigated in the Central District of California
before the Honorable Stephen Wilson.67 Plaintiffs and Grokster filed cross-
motions for summary judgment on liability.68 Reasoning that plaintiffs
"principally seek prospective injunctive relief,, 69 the court addressed only
the issue of whether plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief against
Grokster's current conduct, and deferred addressing whether Grokster was
liable for damages arising out of its past conduct.
60. Id. at 436-37.
61. Id. at 442.
62. Napster at 1021.
63. Id. at 1022.
64. Id. (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919-920 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (C.D. Cal.
2003); see also Metro-Goldwin-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6994
(listing U.S. District Judge Stephen Wilson as ruling on the case).
68. Grokster at 1031.
69. Id. at 1033.
70. Id.
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Like the Ninth Circuit in Napster, the Grokster court concluded that
the service's end users had directly infringed upon plaintiffs' copyrights. 1
From there, however, the analyses of the two courts diverged. The court
commenced its analysis of whether Grokster had knowledge of the
infringing conduct by finding that Grokster was capable of substantial
noninfringing current and potential uses.72
The court then embarked on an exegesis on the showing necessary to
establish the knowledge requirement.73 The court first examined whether
under the Sony "staple article of commerce" doctrine 74 there existed
"substantial noninfringing uses" for Grokster; 75 it concluded that Grokster's
software "is being used, and could be used, for substantial noninfringing
uses."
76
Citing Napster, the court then postulated that "liability for
contributory infringement accrues where a defendant has actual-not
merely constructive-knowledge of the infringement at a time during
which the defendant materially contributes to that infringement. ' 77 The
court went on to agree with Grokster that "in order to be liable under a
theory of contributory infringement, [the system] must have actual
knowledge of infringement at a time when [it] can use that knowledge to
stop the particular infringement., 78  While the court conceded that
"[Grokster is] generally aware that many of [its] users employ [Grokster's]
software to infringe copyrighted works," it ultimately concluded that since
Grokster only had knowledge of the infringements after they occurred, it
did not have the requisite knowledge when it was able to "do something
about it."
79
Turning to the issue of material contribution, the court framed the
critical question as whether Grokster "[does] anything, aside from
distributing software, to actively facilitate-or whether [it] could do
anything to stop-[its] users' infringing activity., 80 The court focused on
the architectural distinction between Napster and Grokster-that when
users search for and initiate transfers of files using the Grokster client, they
71. Id. at 1035.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Sony at 491 n.41.
75. Grokster at 1035.
76. Id. at 1036.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1037.
79. See id. at 1038.
80. Id. at 1039.
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do so "without any information being transmitted to or through any
computers owned or controlled by Grokster." '81 As a result, it noted, while
Napster had "perfect knowledge and complete control over the infringing
activity of its users," 82 Grokster did not, and therefore Grokster did not
provide the "'site and facilities"' for the alleged infringement. 83 The court
examined the technical assistance provided by Grokster to its users, and its
ongoing communications with its users, and dismissed these factors as
"irrelevant" as to whether Grokster materially contributed to its users'
infringement.84
In its conclusion, the court stated that it "is not blind to the possibility
that [Grokster] may have intentionally structured [its] businesses to avoid
secondary liability for copyright infringement, while benefiting financially
from the illicit draw of [its] wares.",85 The court added that "additional
legislative guidance may be well-counseled. 86
IV. THE ANALYSIS
Both the Napster and Grokster courts agree that "one is liable for
contributory infringement if with knowledge of the infringing activity,
[she] induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another. '87 The issue in question is how each court applies this test.
A. Standard of Knowledge Required to Establish Contributory Copyright
Infringement
The Grokster decision's analysis of the knowledge standard for
contributory infringement cannot be reconciled with the Napster decision.
The Grokster court requires a contributory copyright infringement plaintiff
to establish that a defendant has actual knowledge of specific acts of
infringement.88 To reach this conclusion, the Grokster decision focuses on
Napster's conclusion that "[t]he record supports the district court's finding
that Napster has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is
available using its system, that it could block access to the system by
81. Grokster at 1040.
82. Id. at 1041.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1042.
85. Id. at 1046.
86. Id.
87. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)).
88. Grokster at 1035.
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suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the
material., 89 In fact, however, Napster does nothing more than hold that a
showing of actual knowledge meets the knowledge requirement necessary
to establish liability. 90 Napster does not limit the showing required to
establish liability to actual knowledge of specific infringements; it adheres
to the traditional formulation of the test that requires "that the secondary
infringer 'know or have reason to know' of direct infringement." 9' Thus,
by requiring the plaintiffs to show actual knowledge, the Grokster court's
analysis marks a departure from the previously established standard.
Also problematic is the Grokster court's pronouncement that to be
liable for contributory infringement, a defendant "must have actual
knowledge of infringement at a time when they can use that knowledge to
stop the particular infringement., 92 This holding also is at odds with the
Napster ruling. Nowhere does Napster or any other controlling authority
suggest that where a defendant knows that infringing activity has been, and
will continue to be, taking place, the knowledge necessary for contributory
infringement must be obtained prior to the infringement. In fact, existing
case law in addition to Napster supports that a defendant's knowledge need
not occur prior to the infringements.
93
The difficulty in squaring Grokster with Napster is evident when
comparing the state of knowledge among the defendants in each case.
With respect to the defendants' state of knowledge, the facts of Napster and
Grokster are virtually identical. Among other evidence of knowledge, both
defendants were informed of the many infringing files on their systems and
subsequently the titles remained available; 94 executives from both systems
either downloaded or searched for copyrighted works on their respective
systems;95 and defendants could not definitively know of an infringement
until after it occurred. 96  Faced with this evidence, the Napster court
89. See id. at 1035; see also Napster at 1022.
90. See Napster at 1021-22.
91. Id. at 1020 (quoting Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902
F.2d 829, 845-846 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
92. Grokster at 1037.
93. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (finding knowledge
element met against swap meet owners based on prior seizures of counterfeit recordings and
notice of prior infringements where infringing vendors left the swap meet and were replaced by
new infringing vendors).
94. See Grokster at 1036-37; see also Napster at 1020 n.5.
95. See Grokster at 1036; see also Napster at 1020 n.5.
96. See Grokster at 1045; see generally Napster at 1027 (finding potential liability based on
Napster's knowledge of infringing uses).
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concluded that the knowledge element had been met. 97 The Grokster court
concluded that the knowledge element had not been met, even though the
Grokster defendants had no less knowledge of infringements "at a time
when they can use that knowledge to stop the particular infringement" than
did Napster.
98
That defendants cannot know of an infringement until after it takes
place highlights the practical problem with the Grokster court's standard.
Napster and Grokster's directories of works available for distribution were
fluid; the directories only housed titles available in real time.
99 To require a
plaintiff to show that a defendant have knowledge of an infringement at a
time when the defendant can "use that knowledge to stop the particular
infringement"' 00 is not, therefore, practical in this context.
B. Commercially Significant Non-Infringing Uses
The Grokster decision also is at odds with Napster on the "staple
article of commerce" doctrine. The Supreme Court in Sony held that
manufacturers and retailers of videotape recorders that have commercially
significant noninfringing uses should not be found to have the knowledge
required for contributory infringement imputed to them solely because they
manufactured or sold the product with knowledge that consumers may use
the product for infringement. 10 1
The Sony court observed that the "staple article of commerce"
doctrine applies to the simple sale of a product to a customer-in Sony's
case, the sale of videocassette recorders.10 2 According to the Ninth Circuit,
however, the doctrine is inapplicable where the system at issue involves
ongoing interaction between seller and buyer.'0 3  The Ninth Circuit
distinguished Napster's servers from the videocassette recorder at issue in
Sony where "[t]he only contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax
occurred at the moment of sale."' 4  The Grokster court, contrary to
Napster's reasoning, applied the language from Sony to immunize conduct
in the context of an ongoing relationship between the provider and the end
97. Napster at 1022.
98. Grokster at 1037.
99. Id. at 1032; see also Napster at 1012.
100. Grokster at 1037.
101. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 at 442.
102. Id. at 426-27.
103. See Napster at 1019 (rejecting the claim that "space shifting" is fair use since it
exposes the copyrighted material to distribution).
104. Sony at 438; see also Napster at 1020 (discussing contributory liability for Napster and
it's conduct within the architecture of the file-sharing system).
2004]
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Moreover, the Grokster court failed to analyze a pivotal part of the
"staple article of commerce" test. Specifically, the court did not explore
whether Grokster was capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses. 10 6  The Napster court framed the issue in accordance with Sony,
seeking to determine whether the Napster system "is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses."' 07 The Grokster opinion did
not mention that the noninfringing uses must be "commercially
significant," much less analyze whether the noninfringing uses set forth by
the Grokster defendants meet this standard.1
0 8
The significance of not applying this element of the Sony doctrine is
evident when comparing the product or service at issue in Sony and in
Grokster. Whereas the doctrine was used in Sony to insulate a product that
was primarily used for noncommercial purposes, the doctrine is used in
Grokster to immunize a service that is primarily used for commercial
infringement on a massive scale. This distinction highlights the importance
of including the "commercially significant" element in applying this test.
C. Material Contribution
The Grokster court framed the inquiry of material contribution as
"whether [defendants] do anything, aside from distributing software, to
actively facilitate-or whether they could do anything to stop-their users'
infringing activity."'1 9 The court also relied on dicta from a district court
case that the primary and secondary infringers must have "acted in concert"
with each other."0 The court concluded that defendants were not liable
because its users "connect to the respective networks, select which files to
share, send and receive searches, and download files, all with no material
involvement of Defendants.""'
Preliminarily, the court's conclusion that distributing software alone
does not constitute contributory infringement appears incorrect. It is
generally accepted law that contributing machinery or goods that provide
the means to infringe may be sufficient to confer liability for contributory
105. See Grokster at 1043.
106. See id. at 1035-36 (discussing noninfringing uses of the Grokster system).
107. Napster at 1021.
108. See Grokster at 1035-36 (discussing noninfringing uses of the Grokster system).
109. Id. at 1039.
110. Marvullo v. Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Livnat
v. Shai Bar Lavi, 1998 WL 43221, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
111. Grokster at 1041.
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infringement.112 Moreover, in Sony, there was no dispute that Sony's role
in marketing the videotape recorders was a material contribution to its
users' infringement; the only reason Sony avoided liability was because the
Court found the recorder to be a staple article of commerce that was
capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.' 
13
In addition, to the extent the Grokster decision is based on the
requirement that the primary and secondary infringer must have "acted in
concert, ' 14 it is inconsistent with Napster. Despite there being no more
evidence of collaboration in Napster than in Grokster, the Napster court
concluded that Napster could be a contributory infringer.' 
5
Ultimately, however, the Grokster court bases its ruling on the issue
of contribution on the primary distinction between the two systems,
concluding that Grokster does not provide "the 'site and facilities' for
direct infringement."'" 6 Instead, Grokster users "connect to the respective
networks, select which files to share, send and receive searches, and
download files, all with no material involvement of Defendants."
'" 7 The
court's focus on the distinctions between the two systems obscures the
ways in which Grokster does contribute to its users' infringements. Most
visibly, the Grokster defendants have provided the "site and facilities" for
direct infringement by creating the Grokster system. They have provided
the software, the search engine, and the means to connect to other Grokster
users to copy, distribute and receive infringing works. In short, they have
provided the infrastructure necessary for its users' infringements to take
place.
The court also ignores or glosses over other ways in which the
Grokster defendants contribute to their users' infringements. For example,
the record indicates that the Grokster defendants, like Napster, initially
created means for users' registration and login; initially operated
centralized supernodes which indexed available files and then processed
user search requests; encrypted many of the communications between their
users to ensure users' anonymity; and provided technical assistance to its
users. 1 18 In addition to those elements of contribution they shared with
112. See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12.04[A][2][b] (2003).
113. Sony at 442.
114. Grokster at 1042 (quoting Marvullo v. Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
115. Napster at 1022.
116. Grokster at 1040.
117. Id. at 1041.
118. Id. at 1032-33.
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Napster, the Grokster defendants also contributed to their users'
infringements by informing the users that software updates were available,
providing users with upgrades and updates to the software, and providing,
and updating, Internet addresses of supernodes to facilitate obtaining works
from other users." 9 In sum, despite the distinction between the two
systems, the many means by which the Grokster defendants materially
contributed to their users' infringements belie the District Court's
conclusion of no material infringement.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs appealed the District Court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 120 The Ninth Circuit heard arguments on the appeal on
February 3, 2004.2' At the date of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has not
issued its ruling.
119. Id. at 1042-43.
120. Jon Healey, Morpheus Maker Upping the Ante, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2004, at C1.
121. Id.
